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ABSTRACT 
 
In the 1990s, Singapore established several industrial parks in Asia to capitalize on the rising demand for low-cost 
manufacturing centers. These parks were envisioned as attractive investment enclaves, boasting a combination of 
location-specific advantages and world-class infrastructure, further complemented by Singapore's ability to negotiate 
investment concessions at an inter-government level. Since the establishment of Singapore's Batamindo Industrial 
Park (BIP) in Riau, Indonesia, similar sites offering more competitive cost structures have emerged. The 
mushrooming of industrial parks is seen as an indication of Batam attractiveness as an investment location, 
reflecting the (Singapore) government’s long-term vision of twinning the contiguous Singapore-Riau economies. 
This paper considers the success of BIP vis-à-vis two non-Singaporean competitor parks, Panbil Industrial Estate 
(PIE) and Tunas Industrial Estate (TIE). Evidence from on-site surveys and interviews are presented. This paper 
concludes that BIP must contend with rising competition from the newer industrial developments, despite retaining 
certain first-mover advantages. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Within 40 years of its independence, Singapore has established an excellent reputation as a worldwide leading trans-
shipment hub as well as a premier location for regional headquarters. Singapore’s corrupt-free government, superior 
infrastructure and efficient workforce, coupled with the reliability of its legal and financial systems, provided an 
important platform that allowed the country’s economic agencies to attract numerous foreign direct investments into 
the city-state [8][14]. However, by the mid-1980s, rising domestic business costs and greater competition in the 
region (notably from Malaysia and Indonesia) were eroding its competitiveness as a low-cost manufacturing 
location, highlighting the need for Singapore to steer its policies towards generating high economic ‘value-added’ 
activities as well as to expand economically beyond its territory. 
 
The Singapore government duly responded; introducing an overseas investment program in 1988 that sought to 
encourage Singapore-based firms to enter into joint ventures and partnerships with foreign firms, especially those in 
Europe and North America, in hope of gaining access foreign markets and their latest technologies [2]. However, 
instead of achieving its objectives, many of the investments resulted in massive financial losses even before the 
early 1990s [5]. Necessity for strategy reformulation was evident; and the Singapore government re-aligned its 
strategy to focus on growth within Asia, justified by the immense potential of developing Asian economies (China, 
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Indonesia and Vietnam) that are experiencing exponential growth rates following the relaxation in foreign 
investment controls. [10].  
 
The principal drive of the regionalization program was to transplant the proven Singapore industrial townships 
model into the region, simulating a `Singapore-styled’ business environment in emerging economies. The aim of the 
regionalization drive was to create economic space for local and Singapore-based companies, enabling resource-
dependent operations to be moved into the region and restructuring their operations in Singapore to focus on higher-
end activities, thereby leveraging on the distinctive advantages offered by each location. 
             
This paper revisits the discussion on the success of Singapore’s first overseas industrial township project - 
Batamindo Industrial Park (Batam Island, Indonesia), as an investment enclave, vis-à-vis its 2 main competitors - 
PIE and TIE. To provide context to the discussion, the theoretical considerations underpinning the flagship 
Batamindo Industrial Park projects are sketched in the next section, followed by an account of the origins and 
progress of the case study parks. The analysis is reinforced by empirical data from our on-site surveys of the Parks’ 
tenants. The final section considers the implications of the new evidence on Singapore’s broader regionalization 
program, and evaluates the city-state’s efforts to harness synergistic complementarities with contiguous areas in its 
strategic intent to restructure the Singapore economy.  
 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Several theories have been expounded on the economic integration of regions to spearhead economic growth and 
development. Perroux [11] postulated the concept of growth poles. In essence, this concept projects the notion of an 
economic space as a field of forces consisting of a nucleus from which centrifugal forces emanate and centripetal forces 
are attracted. Bouderville [1], extending Perroux's concept, has defined a regional growth pole as a set of expanding 
industries located in an urban area inducing further developments of economic activity through its zone of influence. 
Hermansen [3] added the thesis that inter-industry, multiplier and accelerator linkages play a major role in the 
development of growth poles and growth centers. Cost reductions through productivity gains, innovations and scale 
economies are viewed as providing the opportunities for propulsive industries to initiate growth, and to pass growth 
impulses through the linkage chains. The discourse on growth poles has been extended, in more recent literature, to 
deliberations on the presence of immobile clusters of complementary value-added activities [6].The transactional 
benefits of spatial proximity (surveyed in [2]) and, in the context of this paper, on notions of growth zones, `defined’ as 
the spread from the early nuclei of economic activities to territories adjacent, or in close proximity, to longer 
established nuclei of industrial growth. In the 1990s, set in the context of the globalization of economic activities, the 
phenomenon took on cross-border dimensions with the promulgation of regional economic zones [13].  
 
Location theories and, in particular, the agglomeration aspects suggest that there are scale economies to be derived 
through certain types of industries, or industrial clusters within a region, namely, internal economies, localization 
economies, and external economies [7]. The agglomeration aspects, as applied to the Singapore-Riau `alliance’, include 
localization economies, urbanization economies, standardization economies and network externalities. Rationalization 
theories suggest that firms should redistribute their operations in different location to capitalize on the comparative 
advantages offered in each location. These theories argue that the production process should be viewed as a value chain, 
and firms should identify the comparative or location-specific advantages unique to each country/territory, and the 
competitive or firm-specific advantages unique to the firm/core functions, and then incorporate these advantages into 
the value chain [12]. In this respect, Batam, given the close proximity to Singapore, fits in strategically. 
 
The strategic thrust of the flagship projects was to get investors to look at Singapore and the Riau islands, which are at 
different stages of development, as a single investment region, and not as separate states competing for investments. 
The flagship projects presented investors with a packaged choice to locate the activities along their value chains in the 
contiguous areas to support "the whole range of business requirements" within a single region. Singapore, for 
instance, can support business operations dependent on advanced technology and sophisticated services, while low 
value, labor-intensive industries can be located in Riau. Specialization in this way is designed to attract investment by 
enabling investors to retain activities in close proximity while making use of contrasting environments i.e. 
complementary specialization in national border territories. In the process, these firms, with their various activities 
located in close proximity, also reap the economies of agglomeration suggested by location theories.  
 
THE INDONESIAN PARKS 
BATAMINDO INDUSTRIAL PARK (BIP) 
  
Indonesia’s program to develop the Riau islands dates back to the late 1960s when Batam was identified as a 
potential logistics and operational base to support offshore oil and gas fields. The development plan was 
subsequently reviewed in 1979, with the Batam Industrial Development Authority (BIDA) opting to focus on the 
development of transhipment facilities, the establishment of industrial estates, the development of marshalling areas 
for imports and exports, the construction of tourist facilities and the provision of infrastructural support. This master 
plan was aimed to leverage on the Riau islands close-geographical proximity to address Singapore’s land and labor 
constraints and, more importantly, to take advantage of Singapore's established business and financial services 
network and the city-state's efficient facilities for communication, transportation and other services.  
 
BIP was launched in 1992. The Park started as a joint-venture between Singaporean government-linked companies 
(GLCs) and the Salim Group of Indonesia. At that time, Salim was Indonesia’s largest business conglomerate, and 
had close links to senior politicians and privileged access to the major investment projects in the Riau Islands [4]. 
Singaporean GLCs were given control over the development and management of the Parks, while Salim’s role was 
to facilitate operations and to leverage on their links to provide a guarantee of priority over regulatory controls and 
administrative approvals. Singapore’s reputation for transparent and efficient management of projects lent further 
credibility to the projects. 
 
A key aspect of BIP’s marketing strategy was to position itself as a self-contained Park with its communication and 
business linkages through Singapore rather than through Indonesia. BIP, for instance, has its own power supply, 
water treatment plant, sewerage system, telecommunications facilities and social amenities. The objective was to 
create an investment enclave that mirror conditions in Singapore, providing the premium Singapore development 
standards in a low-income economy.  
 
BIP’s first tenants were mainly subsidiaries of American, European, and Japanese multinationals already operating 
in Singapore. Cumulative investments and export value in BIP topped US$1billion and US$2 billion in 2002 
respectively, and the number of confirmed tenants increased from 17 in 1991 to 85 in 2004. Of these, 39 were 
Japanese companies with Singapore-owned companies the next largest concentration at 25. American and European 
investors accounts for less than 20 percent of the total client base. There is a concentration of electronics operations, 
mainly various component assembly processes, and supporting activities to the electronics sector such as plastic 
molding and packaging. Total employment stands at 65,000. 
 
PANBIL INDUSTRIAL ESTATE (PIE) 
 
Panbil was started by PT Nusatama Properata Panbil in conjunction with Panbil Investment Holding Company. PT 
Nusatama Properata Panbil is a wholly-owned subsidiary of PT. Harapan Jaya Sentosa group which includes 
established companies in the involved in the planning, development, construction and management of industrial, 
commercial, and residential properties. PIE is backed by Indonesia’s Government Bank, including Bank Mandiri, 
regarded as the biggest Bank in Indonesia, and local government authorities, investors can expect the best possible 
assistance and standards. 
 
Located at the centre of Batam Island, Panbil Industrial Estate is a US$150 million development project on 130 
hectares of prime land. It is conceived as a state-of-the-art, integrated and self-contained industrial township. Its 
synergized location, world-class infrastructure and service-support allow investors to tap into Singapore’s excellent 
hub facilities, and Indonesia’s competitive operation incentives. PIE has also invested in a range of facilities such as 
on-site power supply and water treatment facilities, executive housing and worker dormitories, as well as 
commercial and other social amenities. As well, PIE also provides logistics support, and state-of-the-art 
telecommunications links. 
For investors, PIE offers a range of land parcel, standard factories for immediate start-up, and customized factories. 
Investors at PIE enjoy a host of incentives which include 100% foreign ownership and other tax concessions 
comparable to those accorded to BIP’s tenants. Currently, there are 8 tenants from Singapore, Malaysia and Tunisia, 
occupying 14 lots within the estate. PIE is in the first stage of development 
 
TUNAS INDUSTRIAL ESTATE (TIE) 
 
Tunas Industrial Estate, managed by Tritunas Mandiri Co.Ltd, is a smaller industrial park compared to the other two 
parks. TIE is developed by Rezeki Putra Riau Co.Ltd, which also built and managed Batam’s Top 100 Plaza and 
supermarket chains, houses, warehouses, and factory buildings on the island. 
 
TIE is strategic located near Batam’s main seaport, and offers basic infrastructural facilities, including ready-built 
factories, dormitories, shops and social amenities. TIE has 17 tenants, including 3 companies from Japan, 4 from 
Singapore and 8 Indonesian companies involved in the production of consumer goods, electronic products and 
industrial services. Tunas Industrial Estate, like BIP and PIE, was conceived as an all-in-one service provider. 
Construction of Tunas Industrial Estate commenced in 1999 with the first of the two phases of development being 
almost completed.  
 
RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
Prior analyses on the Parks have relied primarily on secondary data from official publications, press reports, etc. To 
obtain primary data on the differential impact of various pull factors on firms’ investment decisions, along with the 
differential impact of different types of constraints on their operations, we surveyed the tenants in BIP, in July 2003 
and BIP’s main competitor industrial parks in Batam, including PIE and TIE, in July 2004. The first set of questions 
sought to determine the profile of the respondents: type of ownership, nature of operations and size of establishment; 
and the second set was structured to gather information on the push-pull affecting the investment decisions of the 
tenants. Other questions pertaining to the respondents’ views on the facilities and services in the Parks were culled 
from the open-ended questions. A total of 43 responses were collected from these parks.  
 
Profile of the respondents 
 
There were 25 respondents in the BIP survey, of which 6 were wholly Singapore-owned, 5 were Singaporean joint 
ventures, and 15 were wholly foreign-owned. The respondents were mainly involved in the manufacturing of 
intermediate products. 6 of the respondents were involved in the manufacture of consumer products, and another 5 
were providers of industrial services. There were 6 respondents with a sales turnovers of less than US$5 million, 13 
respondents with turnovers between US$5 million and US$50 million, and the remaining had turnovers exceeding 
US$50 million. 
 
Of the 18 respondents from other Batam parks, 8 were wholly Singapore-owned, 4 were wholly Indonesian-owned, 
4 were wholly foreign-owned and 2 were joint venture. As for the nature of operations, 11 of the respondents were 
involved in manufacturing of intermediate products, 2 were involved in consumer products while the remaining are 
involved in industrial and other services. 13 respondents had a sales turnover less than US$5 million and 3 
respondents had sales between US$5 million and US$50 million. 
 
Statistical Treatment of Survey Results 
 
Apart from analyzing the descriptive statistics and popular rankings on the responses related to factors and 
constraints, logit analysis was used to compare the push/pull factors influencing the tenants’ decision to locate in the 
Parks. The logit model, estimated by the maximum likelihood, takes the following form: 
 
Pi = exp(Zi) / [ 1 + exp(Zi)] 
 
where:  Pi is the probability of firm being located in the particular park 
            exp refers to the exponentiation operator, and 
    Zi is a linear function of the push/pull factors defined as   
 
i = 7 
Zi = α0 + ∑ αi Fi 
i = 1 
 
where: Fi (1 to n, depending on the type of push/pull factor) = 1 if constraint i is selected, 0 otherwise  
α0 = constant term 
αi = coefficient of independent (explanatory) variable 
 
Estimated coefficients in the logit model, if statistically significant (as indicated by the p-values), would suggest that 
the firm choosing that particular push/pull factor is more likely to be from BIP than from Non-BIP parks. A similar 
logit model was applied to the constraints faced by the Parks’ tenants: 
 
Pi = exp(Zi) / [ 1 + exp(Zi)] 
 
 where:    Pi is the probability of firm being located in the particular park 
                exp refers to the exponentiation operator, and 
      Zi is a linear function of the constraints defined as  
 
i = n 
Zi = β0 + ∑ βi Ci 
i = 1 
 
where: Ci (1 to n, depending on the type of constraint) = 1 if constraint i is selected, 0 otherwise  
β0 = constant term 
βi = coefficient of independent (explanatory) variable 
 
In this case, estimated coefficients in the logit model, if positive and statistically significant, would suggest that the 
firm choosing that particular constraint is more likely to be from BIP than from competitor parks.  
 
 
FINDINGS 
 
Factors influencing respondents’ decision to invest in BIP/Non-BIP Batam parks (Table 1) 
 
Singapore leverages on its infrastructure development expertise and the low-cost labor available in the host 
environments to market BIP. BIP supplements these purported advantages with the political commitment from the 
Singapore government, with the plethora of bilateral agreements between Singapore’s GLCs and host governments, 
or politically-linked business conglomerates. Furthermore, there is a host of investment incentives that entice 
multinationals to locate their lower value-added activities in BIP, giving it a host of advantage over the competitor 
parks.  
 
BIP was largely developed by Singapore’s government-linked companies, and marketed as Singapore-styled parks 
with infrastructural facilities, factories and amenities to match. As such, it was no surprise that BIP tenants surveyed 
ranked reliable infrastructure as the key factor influencing their decision to invest in the park. Considerations over 
infrastructural facilities also ranked amongst the priorities of the tenants in the competitor parks, but a positive and 
statistically significant α4 (=5.019) suggested that this was a more significant factor for BIP tenants than those in the 
competitor parks. It is plausible that BIP tenants, who paid premium rates for the premium Singapore-styled 
infrastructure, were more inclined to emphasize this factor. On the other hand, the tenants in the competitor parks 
were more prepared to strike a compromise between reliable infrastructure and lower overhead costs, and were less 
likely to place as much emphasis on this factor. 
 Correspondingly, competitive labor cost has been cited as the second most important reason for BIP tenants and the 
most significant factor for tenants in BIP’s competitor parks to locate in their respective industrial parks. This result 
is not unexpected, as Batam serves as a low-cost investment enclave for manufacturing companies, and a large 
proportion of the BIP tenants and PIE/TIE tenants surveyed engaged in labor-intensive manufacturing activities. 
This finding is consistent with the location theories surveyed in this paper, which assert that firms view their 
operations as a value chain and seek to enjoy location-specific advantages associated with establishing part of its 
operations in the host country/territory.  
 
 
Constraints on respondents' operations in BIP and competitor parks (Table 2) 
 
The case-study parks are now established industrial-estate developments, but our study alludes to some emerging 
constraints which have undermined the attractiveness of the parks. These constraints are categorized into three broad 
groups, namely, those relating to labor, those relating to organization and technology, and those relating to the 
economic ‘environment’, such as government policies and regulations. 
 
Labor-related constraints 
 
Industrial relations problems has been cited as the main labor-related constraint faced by BIP tenants (but less so by 
PIE/TIE tenants), as indicated by the positive and statistically significant β3 (=3.887). Industrial relations problems 
were frequently cited as being very disruptive to the operations of the tenants in BIP, as workers unhappy with labor 
laws often employ pressure tactics such as strikes, demonstrations and work-to-rule. On the other hand, shortages of 
unskilled/semi labor were found to have affected PIE/TIE tenants to a greater extent than those in BIP, as indicated 
by the negative and statistically significant β1 (=-2.417). This finding is not surprising, as the tenants in the 
competitor parks are largely small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), engaged in relatively the low-cost 
supporting industries, and hence their dependence on unskilled/semi-skilled workers to sustain the viability of their 
operations. As may be expected, shortages of professionals and managers has been ranked the most common 
constraint experienced by firms in BIP and the main constraint faced by firms in the competitor parks. This can be 
attributed to the limited availability of the training institutes/centers in Batam. 
 
Organizational and technology-related constraints 
 
In BIP, the Singapore-styled infrastructure, though reliable and efficient, also proved to be costly, as facilities such 
as the power plant, waste-treatment system and water supply are independently managed. This constraint is also felt 
by tenants in the competitor parks, which offered reliable infrastructure at prices only marginally lower than that of 
BIP. This has resulted in high overhead costs, especially felt by BIP tenants, more so than by non-BIP tenants. This 
was suggested by the positive and statistically significant β2 (=3.183). Other organizational/ technological 
constraints faced by BIP tenants surveyed, but to a lesser extent by PIE/TIE respondents, was the difficulty in 
obtaining raw materials as indicated by the positive and statistically significant β4 (=2.835). This may be due to 
perceptions, and frustrations, over the government’s inefficiency in expediting permits necessary for the 
procurement of raw materials from overseas. The tenant-firms in the competitor parks, given their limited scale of 
operations, are possibly more nimble in sourcing for alternatives. 
  
`Environmental’ constraints 
 
‘Impact of host government regulations’ was the main constraint faced by both BIP and non-BIP respondents. The 
government’s lack of transparency, coupled with political uncertainties in recent years has resulted in ‘constantly 
shifting legal parameters’ that only serve to complicate the operating environment. BIP tenants found this to be a 
greater concern than PIE/TIE tenants as indicated by the positive and statistically significant β1 (=2.174), an 
observation that can plausibly be explained by the type of firms and the nature of operations of the respondents in 
the case-study parks. The largely foreign-owned firms, with the larger scale of operations operating out of BIP, 
would arguably be more perturbed by changes in government regulations and, generally, the host environment, as 
compared to the street-savvy SMEs in the competitor parks. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
From our empirical studies, the consensus is that the political climate created by the Singapore and Indonesian 
governments, the factor conditions and the created infrastructures are the main determinants that shape the 
synergistic appeal of BIP. On the other hand, firms had invested in PIE/TIE for reasons largely similar to that of BIP 
investors (although to differing extents), with exception of political commitment from Singapore. In addition, the 
presence of major buyers proved to be a more important consideration for PIE/TIE tenants than BIP tenants. Tenants 
in all three survey industrial parks were also able to tap into the low-cost environments of the parks, as well as 
leverage on Singapore-styled infrastructure (which PIE and TIE had both sought to emulate), management and 
expertise. These findings lend support to the rationalization theories presented in this paper, and affirm the 
agglomeration economies suggested by the location theories.   
 
BIP, being the pioneer industrial park in Batam, can also be credited for turning Batam into an attractive low-cost 
investment location. The subsequent mushrooming of 17 other industrial parks, though not the original strategic 
intent for commissioning the BIP project, allowed Batam to cater to a wider range of investors, each with varied 
budgets and operational requirements. Faced with keen competition, each of these parks is forced to constantly 
improve and innovate as they seek to survive in the competitive environment, in the process, further augmenting the 
overall appeal of Batam. The resultant influx and clustering of firms within Batam, albeit in different industrial 
parks, creates a reinforcing process whereby more firms are encouraged to invest in Batam to capitalize on the 
economies of agglomeration. This represents a step forward towards achieving the (Singapore) government’s long-
term vision of twinning the contiguous Singapore-Riau economies.  
 
Nonetheless, as most openly admitted, the strategically `engineered’, inter-government endorsement of the flagship 
projects, and the enormous resources mobilized through the strategic partnerships, had failed to shield BIP from a 
gamut of problems. Issues pertaining to the scale and character of development of BIP are discussed in our earlier 
papers [13]. Peachey et al [9] have drawn attention to the influx of immigrants to the islands and, concomitantly, to 
the social problems of squatter settlements which threaten to overwhelm the investment value of the Indonesian 
parks. The decline of the Salim Group political influence has left BIP’s ability to gain privileged access to the 
central government in doubt, while the decentralization of power to provincial government in recent years has 
exacerbated the increasingly complex operating environment for foreign firms. The following observations update 
on recent development and offer new insights on BIP in Indonesia. 
 
Heightened competition  
BIP has been facing increasingly strong mounting competition from competing parks within their vicinity. 
Competitor parks, some of which are backed by prominent Indonesian politicians, have sprouted around BIP. PIE, 
for instance, is located directly opposite BIP, and offers similar factories at competitive rentals. In fact, PIE has 
taken BIP’s one-stop and self-sufficient environment concept one step further by integrating a shopping complex 
and executive housing into their industrial park, both with notable success. TIE, which clinched 7 new tenants 
within 5 months, attributed their success to their ability to differentiate themselves through their emphasis on Total 
Quality Management approach and relationship building. Latrade Industrial Park, Citra Buana Industrial Park I and 
II, Citra Nusa Industrial Park and Bintang Industrial Park, cut in at the small-and-medium enterprise segment. 
Competition among these competitor parks had been nothing less than cut-throat, with many park operators willing 
to provide massive discounts to entice new tenants. Since 1999, BIP’s growth momentum has stagnated, with 
majority of the new investments into Batam heading towards competitor parks, persuaded by the lure of lower cost 
and better value for their investment. The premium placed on BIP’s formulaic one-stop service, and self-sufficient 
operating environment, is increasingly called into question.  
 
As well, competition is not limited to within Indonesia. China and India’s growing economic importance has 
increasingly directing foreign direct investments intended for this region into these two countries as firms seek to 
benefit through closer proximity to these enormous domestic markets. Indonesia’s minimum wage level works out 
to US$66 per month against Myanmar’s US$16 and Bangladesh’s US$18 for labor-intensive sectors such as textile, 
footwear, toys and fashion accessories. Foreign investors have also taken issue over the perceived reluctance of 
authorities to clamp down on worksite stoppages2.  Recent press reports on Batam’s investor exodus3 cited sluggish 
bureaucracy, lack of legal certainty and security, and unclear investment policies as reasons for investors relocating 
their investments from the province, and Indonesia. Populist measures such as raising the minimum wages before 
the general elections in 2004, further heighten the reluctance of investors to pour money into the country. Anecdotal 
evidence, gathered from our on-site interview with the management and tenants of the case-study parks revealed that 
new investments into Batam are drying up as a result of intense competition from competitor parks in the region 
(notably China and Vietnam), and compounded by the host of internal problems that radiate from the host 
environment.  
 
CONCLUDING STATEMENTS 
 
To a large extent, BIP have succeeded in providing the crucial links within the value-added chain that give client 
firms a competitive advantage. While BIP is now a well-established project, it has not necessarily achieved all its 
development goals. It has been a springboard for Singapore-Indonesian co-operation in Riau, but it is not yet clear 
that Singapore has obtained the resource benefits looked for. The problem lies on the flip side of the desired 
strategic fit – the host country’s ability to provide comparative advantages. In both scenarios, the host government 
has succeeded only in making available the advantages of ‘basic factors of production’. Thus, while the case-study 
parks do provide some components of comparative advantage which the host country does not (e.g. reliable 
infrastructure), the strategic intent of these cross-border industrial development projects remains stymied by non-
economic, socio-political complexities in the larger host environment. Despite retaining certain first mover 
advantage, BIP must contend with rising competition from the newer industrial developments, both within and 
beyond Batam, as well as the restricted appeal of its immediate operating conditions. 
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TABLE 1 
FACTORS INFLUENCING THE RESPONDENTS’ DECISIONS TO INVEST IN 
BIP/NON-BIP PARKS 
 
Popular Ranking Maximum Likelihood 
Estimates - Binary 
Logitsψ BIP PIE/Tunas Variables 
α ι p-valueφ 
Frequenc
y Rank Frequency Rank 
Political commitment from Singapore 
Government 3.851 0.026 ** 15 5 0 7 
Stable Government 2.135 0.110  17 4 8 2 
Competitive Overheads 6.754 0.006 *** 20 2 8 2 
Reliable Infrastructure 5.019 0.007 *** 21 1 8 2 
Competitive Labor Cost -1.863 0.299  20 2 11 1 
Presence of Major Buyers -1.588 0.300  15 5 8 2 
Access to Domestic Market 1.706 0.351  5 7 3 6 
Constant -8.828 0.004 ***     
 
TABLE 2 
CONSTRAINTS ON THE RESPONDENTS’ OPERATIONS IN BIP/NON-BIP PARKS 
 
Popular Ranking Maximum Likelihood 
Estimates - Binary 
Logitsψ BIP Non-BIP parks Variables 
αι p-valueφ 
Frequenc
y Rank Frequency Rank 
Labor Constraint        
Shortage of semi/unskilled labor -2.417 0.087 * 1 4 6 2 
Shortage of  professionals and 
managers 1.303 0.181  10 2 8 1 
Industrial Relation Problem 3.887 0.004 *** 15 1 1 3 
Others 1.163 0.452  4 3 1 3 
Constant -1.055 0.199      
Organizational/Technological 
Constraints        
Difficulty in obtaining capital 
equipment -0.344 0.694  5 3 8 2 
Difficulty in obtaining raw material 3.183 0.007 *** 16 2 5 3 
Difficulty in securing funds for 
expansion 0.914 0.375  4 4 3 4 
High overheads 2.835 0.017 ** 18 1 9 1 
Constant -3.303 0.016 ** 0 5 1 5 
Environmental Constraints        
Impact on Government Regulation 2.174 0.006 *** 22 1 8 1 
Reduced Involvement from Singapore 
Government -0.405 0.781  1 2 2 2 
Constant -1.147 0.094 *     
 
Note:  
ψ Estimated values were taken from “forced entry” regression.    
φ p-values are for 2-tailed tests. 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level 
*** Significant at 1% level 
 
Source: Questionnaire surveys. 
 
